地区异议：地方经济条件是否影响联邦公开市场委员会投票？
Regional Dissent: Do Local Economic Conditions Influence FOMC Votes?
AER: Insights · 2025 · [{"name": "Anton Bobrov", "affiliation": ["University of Michigan"]}, {"name": "Rupal Kamdar", "affiliation": ["Indiana University Bloomington"]}, {"name": "Mauricio Ulate", "affiliation": ["Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco"]}]
中文摘要
美国货币政策决策由联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）的12名投票成员作出，其中7名成员天然代表国家层面的利益。其余成员来自次国家辖区，是从12个联邦储备区行长中轮值产生的一个群体。这一结构是否会对货币政策制定过程产生影响？我们提供新的证据表明，地区经济状况会影响储备区行长的投票行为。具体而言，地区失业率比全国水平高1个百分点，与其在FOMC投票中支持更宽松政策而持异议的概率高约9个百分点相关。（JEL E24, E32, E43, E52, E58）
Abstract
US monetary policy decisions are made by the 12 voting members of the FOMC, seven of which inherently represent national-level interests. The remaining members, a rotating group of presidents from the 12 Federal Reserve districts, come instead from subnational jurisdictions. Does this structure have implications for the monetary policymaking process? We provide novel evidence that regional economic conditions influence the voting behavior of district presidents. Specifically, a regional unemployment rate that is 1 percentage point higher than the national level is associated with an approximately 9 percentage point higher probability of dissenting in favor of looser policy at the FOMC. (JEL E24, E32, E43, E52, E58)