中文摘要
出口管制通过限制贸易来阻止对手获得有助于军事能力的商品，但其有效性取决于贸易和生产如何在各国间调整。我们将美国出口管制分类与许可结果的新数据，与一个包含军民两用生产、投入—产出关联以及民用与军用最终支出分离的量化一般均衡模型相结合。我们估计出这些管制带来较大的出口与进入摩擦。对于美国对多边出口管制机制（MECR）成员的出口，这些效应明显更小：其差异相当于15至29个对数点的出口成本。相对于对对手不实行差别管制的反事实情形，多边管制对对手受管制产品进口的削减远大于美国单边管制。在多边机制下，受管制出口减少量中仅7%被他国替代，而在美国单边政策下这一比例为28%。多边管制通过提高对手的军用价格指数来削减其实际军费开支。以美国实际军费开支相对对手的水平衡量的安全影响，在多边管制下上升约1个对数点，而在单边管制下仅上升0.14个对数点，且两者造成的民用实际成本相近。即便是美国实施禁运，也无法再现多边管制下的安全结果。
Abstract
Export controls restrict trade to limit adversaries’ access to goods that contribute to military capability, but their effectiveness depends on how trade and production adjust across countries. We combine new data on U.S. export control classifications and licensing outcomes with a quantitative general equilibrium model featuring dual-use production, input-output linkages, and separate civilian and military final expenditure. We estimate large export and entry frictions from these controls. These effects are substantially smaller for U.S. exports to members of multilateral export control regimes (MECRs): the differential is equivalent to an export cost of 15 to 29 log points. Relative to a counterfactual without differential controls on adversaries, multilateral controls reduce their imports of controlled products far more than unilateral U.S. controls. Only 7% of the reduction in controlled exports under the multilateral regime is replaced by other countries, compared with 28% under unilateral U.S. policy. Multilateral controls reduce adversaries’ real military expenditure by increasing their military price index. The security impact, measured as U.S. real military expenditure relative to adversaries, rises by about 1 log point under multilateral controls but only 0.14 log points under unilateral controls, with both imposing a similar civilian real cost. Even a U.S. embargo fails to reproduce the multilateral security outcome.