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抵押贷款市场中的定价权:来自GSE费用减免的证据

Pricing Power in the Mortgage Market: Evidence from GSE Fee Waivers
NBER Working Papers · 2026 · Neil Bhutta、Benjamin J. Keys、Adithya Raajkumar

中文摘要

市场力量不仅可能来自企业,还可能来自能够利用对消费者信息优势的个体销售人员。我们通过考察一项针对低收入首次购房者的房利美/房地美(Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac)费用减免政策,在抵押贷款市场中探究这一现象。我们估计,2023–2024年总计15亿美元的费用减免中,抵押贷款中介截留了超过60%,而未将这些节省完全传递给借款人。费用减免的传导率在不同信贷员之间差异很大:有发放高成本抵押贷款记录(独立于贷款机构定价)的信贷员,其传导率不足20%。我们的证据表明,尽管危机后出台了旨在限制此类做法的监管规定,信贷员仍有引导借款人选择更高利率抵押贷款的激励。

Abstract

Market power may arise not only from firms, but also from individual salespeople who can exploit informational advantages over consumers. We explore this phenomenon in the mortgage market by examining a Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac fee waiver targeted at lower-income first-time homebuyers. We estimate that mortgage intermediaries capture over 60% of $1.5 billion in total fee waivers during 2023–2024, rather than fully passing these savings through to borrowers. Pass-through varies substantially across loan officers: those with a track record of originating expensive mortgages (independent of lender pricing) pass through less than 20% of the waiver. Our evidence suggests that loan officers retain incentives to steer borrowers into higher-rate mortgages, despite post-crisis regulations designed to limit such practices.
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