Capturing the Benefits of Autonomous Vehicles in Ride Hailing: The Role of Market Configuration
中文摘要
我们构建了一个自动驾驶汽车(AV)网约车市场的经济模型,其中不确定的总需求由固定的AV车队与灵活的人类司机(HV)池的组合来服务。由于密度效应,调度效率随规模上升而提高。我们在这一设定下分析了四种市场构型下的市场结果,这些构型由两种调度平台结构(共同平台与独立平台)和两种供给竞争水平(垄断AV与竞争性AV)界定。我们分析的一个关键结果是:AV较低的成本并不必然转化为更低的价格;AV对价格的影响是不明确的,且关键取决于调度平台结构与AV供给竞争水平两个方面。在极端情形下,我们证明,若AV与HV在独立的调度平台上运营、AV供应商为垄断者,且劳动供给弹性足够高,则价格甚至会高于纯HV市场。事实上,要在所有情形下以及在所有供给弹性与密度弹性下保证价格始终更低(相对于纯HV市场),需要AV与HV之间采用共同的调度平台。此外,在每一种此类情形中,竞争性AV都比垄断AV带来更低的价格。我们的结果说明了市场构型在实现AV潜在福利收益中所扮演的关键角色。
Abstract
We develop an economic model of autonomous vehicle (AV) ride-hailing markets, in which uncertain aggregate demand is served with a combination of a fixed fleet of AVs and a flexible pool of human drivers (HVs). Dispatch efficiencies increase with scale because of density effects. We analyze market outcomes in this setting under four market configurations, defined by two dispatch platform structures (common platform versus independent platforms) and two levels of supply competition (monopoly AV versus competitive AV). A key result of our analysis is that the lower cost of AVs does not necessarily translate into lower prices; the price impact of AVs is ambiguous and depends critically on both the dispatch platform structure and the level of AV supply competition. In the extreme case, we show that if AVs and HVs operate on independent dispatch platforms, there is a monopoly AV supplier, and labor supply elasticity is sufficiently high, then prices are even higher than in a pure-HV market. Indeed, to guarantee consistently lower prices (relative to a pure HV market) in all scenarios and under all supply and density elasticities, a common dispatch platform between AVs and HVs is required. Furthermore, competitive AVs lead to lower prices than monopoly AVs in every such scenario. Our results illustrate the critical role that market configuration plays in realizing potential welfare gains from AVs.