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有害型首席执行官;作为监督者的环境、社会与治理机构投资者;以及劳动市场结果

Toxic Chief Executive Officers; Environmental, Social, and Governance Institutional Investors as Watchdogs; and the Labor Market Outcomes
Management Science · 2025 · Ugur Lel

中文摘要

本文考察企业环境失败发生后首席执行官(CEO)劳动市场结果的变化。受到美国环境保护署执法的企业的CEO,其作为外部董事的劳动市场机会出现下降,作为CEO被解职的可能性更高。此外,他们在董事选举中获得的股东支持也更少。这些效应主要显现于近年以及社会责任投资(SRI)规模较大的企业中,并且在以州环境法规进行识别时依然稳健。股东对可能使企业面临未来法律责任的环境违规尤为关注。总体而言,这些结果表明环境失败会给CEO带来显著的声誉影响,并彰显了SRI的惩戒作用。

Abstract

I examine changes in chief executive officer (CEO) labor market outcomes following corporate environmental failures. CEOs of firms subject to Environmental Protection Agency enforcements experience a decline in labor market opportunities as outside directors and a higher likelihood of dismissal as CEOs. They also receive less shareholder support in directorial elections. These effects are mostly visible in recent years and in firms with significant socially responsible investments (SRIs), and they are robust to using state environmental regulations for identification. Shareholders exhibit particular concern over environmental violations that may subject firms to future legal liabilities. Overall, these results point to significant reputational repercussions of environmental failures to CEOs and the disciplinary role of SRIs.
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