中文摘要
我们基于中国历史上一次骤然改变人才配置的实验, 考察人才供给如何影响金融发展。在科举取士制度下, 入仕为官是中国知识分子的主要就业去向。1905 年该制度被废除, 降低了入仕所附带的社会地位与财富, 促使知识分子转而投向作为高地位就业部门的现代银行业。我们发现, 1905 年之后, 科举考生人数较多的地区产生了更多的金融专业人才, 这进而转化为现代银行业更大的发展。
Abstract
We examine how the supply of talent affected financial development based on an experiment that abruptly changed the allocation of talent in historical China. Under the meritocratic civil examination system, government service was the main employment for the Chinese intellectuals. The abolition of this system in 1905 reduced the status and wealth attached to government service, which led the intellectuals to turn to modern banking as a high-status sector of employment. We find that regions where there were more candidates for the civil examination produced more financial professionals after 1905, which translated to a greater development of modern banking.