中文摘要
美国证券交易委员会(SEC)允许管理层申请将股东发起的提案排除在外。我利用SEC对管理层申请的回复,构建了一个包含被排除提案与被撤回提案的新型数据集。对撤回与排除决定的公告收益的考察表明,SEC质疑的提案具有破坏价值的作用。我发现,追求自利议程的特殊利益投资者与倡导“一刀切”改革的散户投资者,解释了SEC质疑提案的破坏价值性质。平均而言,SEC的质疑通过过滤掉这些有害提案而提升企业价值。然而,断点回归设计显示,SEC拒绝排除的提案可能获得股东的多数支持并破坏企业价值。
Abstract
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) permits managers to request the exclusion of shareholder-initiated proposals. I construct a novel data set of excluded and withdrawn proposals from the SEC’s responses to managers’ requests. An examination of announcement returns to withdrawal and exclusion decisions demonstrates that SEC-challenged proposals are value destroying. I find that special interest investors pursuing self-serving agendas and retail investors advocating for one-size-fits-all reforms explain the value-destroying nature of SEC-challenged proposals. On average, the SEC challenge benefits firm value by filtering out these harmful proposals. However, a regression discontinuity design reveals that proposals the SEC refuses to exclude may receive majority shareholder support and destroy firm value.