Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: The Impact of California’s Cap-and-Trade Program on Toxic Emissions
中文摘要
我们实证考察了加州引入总量控制与交易计划的后果,结果表明,尽管该计划有助于减少温室气体 (GHG) 排放,但也产生了意想不到的后果——受处理设施的有毒排放增加,因为这些设施为减少温室气体排放而削减了废弃物处理方面的投入。我们进一步发现,对于危害更大的毒素、已在源头削减有毒废弃物方面进行投资的设施,以及受到监管机构密切审查的设施,这一效应较弱,这与该效应源于企业策略性行为的解释相一致。
Abstract
We empirically examine the consequences of the introduction of a cap-and-trade program in California, showing that although the program helped reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, it had the unintended consequence of increasing toxic emissions from treated facilities, as facilities cut back on their waste-treatment efforts to reduce GHG emissions. We further show that this effect was weaker for more harmful toxins, for facilities that had invested in reducing toxic waste at source, and for those that were subject to close scrutiny from regulators, consistent with it being the result of strategic firm actions.