The Deterrence Effects of Tax Whistleblower Laws: Evidence from New York’s False Claims Acts
中文摘要
在本研究中,我们为州税收举报人法的效应提供了证据。我们利用纽约《虚假申报法》(FCA) 2010 年一项新颖的修正案,该修正案明确将举报激励扩展至企业所得税举报人。我们利用机构层级数据和描述性分析识别受处理企业(即暴露于纽约 FCA 的企业)。基于暴露于纽约及其邻近州的企业样本,我们发现证据表明纽约 FCA 减少了州税避税。在横截面检验中,我们发现效应随企业授予员工股票期权的减少以及行业监管而增强,这与威慑力随员工和监管者监督增强而提高相一致。我们还发现证据表明,纽约 FCA 对联邦税避税具有威慑作用,这与正向的垂直税收外部性相一致。接下来,我们聚焦于特定的税收策略,发现证据表明“双层爱尔兰”(Double Irish) 税收结构的概率降低、与税务筹划银行的关系减少、特殊目的实体的使用减少,以及出于税收动机的对外所得转移减少。我们还发现证据表明,搬迁成本最低(最高)的企业:(1) 减少了(未改变)其在纽约的机构数量,但 (2) 未改变(减少了)州税避税。最后,我们利用手工收集的纽约州总检察长发布的税收举报人新闻稿,将一般性的事前威慑与事前同伴威慑区分开来。我们发现了这两类威慑的证据。总体而言,本研究为税收举报人法的威慑效应提供了具有政策相关性的证据。
Abstract
In this study, we provide evidence on the effects of state tax whistleblower laws. We exploit a novel 2010 amendment to New York’s False Claims Acts (FCA) that explicitly extended whistleblower incentives to corporate income tax whistleblowers. We identify treated firms (firms exposed to New York’s FCA) using establishment-level data and descriptive analyses. Using a sample of firms exposed to New York and neighboring states, we find evidence that New York’s FCA reduced state tax avoidance. In cross-sectional tests, we find that effects are increasing in firms that grant fewer employee stock options and industry regulation, consistent with deterrence increasing in employee and regulator monitoring. We also find evidence that New York’s FCA deterred federal tax avoidance, consistent with positive vertical tax externalities. Next, we focus on particular tax strategies and find evidence of a reduced probability of Double Irish tax structures, reduced relationships to tax planning banks, reduced use of special purpose vehicles, and reduced outbound tax-motivated income shifting. We also find evidence that firms with the lowest (highest) cost of relocation (1) reduced (did not change) establishment counts in New York but (2) did not change (reduced) state tax avoidance. Finally, we disentangle general ex ante deterrence from ex ante peer deterrence using hand-collected New York tax whistleblower press releases from the Attorney General. We find evidence of both types of deterrence. Overall, this study provides policy-relevant evidence on the deterrence effects of tax whistleblower laws.