Management Science · 2025 · Miguel Antón、Florian Ederer、Mireia Giné、Martin Schmalz
中文摘要
当其他企业从某企业的发明中获益、从而使创新企业无法获取其创新的全部剩余时，企业进行创新的激励会低至无效率的水平。我们从理论上证明，企业的共同持股可以缓解这一对企业创新的阻碍。相反，在不存在技术溢出的情况下，创新具有从竞争对手那里夺取市场份额的效果，此时更多的共同持股反而会降低创新。在实证上，共同持股与创新投入和产出之间的关联随产品市场邻近度的上升而减弱，随技术邻近度的上升而增强。因此，共同持股与企业创新之间整体关系的符号和量级在企业总体中差异相当大，取决于各企业在技术和产品市场空间中的相对邻近度。若仅使用贝莱德（BlackRock）收购巴克莱全球投资者（BGI）所带来的变异，部分结果依然成立。我们的发现为关于美国企业间共同持股增加之福利效应的争论提供了依据。
Abstract
Firms have inefficiently low incentives to innovate when other firms benefit from their inventions and the innovating firm therefore does not capture the full surplus of its innovations. We show that, in theory, common ownership of firms mitigates this impediment to corporate innovation. By contrast, without technological spillovers, innovation has the effect of stealing market share from rivals and in that case more common ownership reduces innovation. Empirically, the association between common ownership and innovation inputs and outputs decreases with product market proximity and increases with technology proximity. The sign and magnitude of the overall relationship between common ownership and corporate innovation thus varies considerably across the universe of firms depending on their relative proximity in technology and product market space. Some of these results persist if we use only variation from BlackRock’s acquisition of BGI. Our findings inform the debate about the welfare effects of increasing common ownership among U.S. corporations.