中文摘要
近期关于搜索中立的监管规定禁止零售平台在消费者的搜索排序中自我优待性地将其第一方产品置于第三方卖家产品之前。本文表明，尽管初衷良好，但由于平台与第三方卖家的策略性决策，搜索中立可能无意中损害消费者和第三方卖家的利益。在短期内，搜索中立会削弱平台与第三方卖家之间的价格竞争：若许多消费者事前偏好第三方产品，则消费者将受损；若许多消费者事前偏好第一方产品，则平台利润可能上升。在长期内，当第三方卖家的进入成本处于中等水平时，搜索中立可能激励平台先发制人地阻止第三方卖家进入，从而进一步损害消费者和第三方卖家。这两种无意造成的损害都源于在线零售平台的两个独特特征：平台会对消费者的搜索排序进行个性化定制，且消费者在深入搜索某产品之前会先观察到产品价格。本文还考虑了搜索中立的替代性表述、消费者的搜索成本及其产品匹配概率，以论证主要结果的稳健性。
Abstract
Recent regulations on search neutrality prohibit retail platforms from self-preferentially prioritizing their first-party products over those of third-party sellers in consumers’ search rankings. This paper shows that, despite its good intention, search neutrality may unintendedly harm consumers and third-party sellers because of the strategic decisions of the platform and third-party sellers. In the short term, search neutrality can weaken the price competition between the platform and third-party sellers, which will hurt consumers if many of them ex ante prefer the third-party product, and can increase the platform’s profit if many consumers ex ante prefer the first-party product. In the long term, search neutrality can incentivize the platform to preempt the entry of third-party sellers if their entry cost is intermediate, further harming consumers and third-party sellers. Both unintended harms stem from two unique features of online retailing platforms: platforms personalize consumers’ search rankings, and consumers observe product prices before searching a product in depth. Alternative formulations of search neutrality, consumers’ search costs, and their product match likelihoods are considered to demonstrate the robustness of the main results.