网约车中的匹配与定价：徒劳追逐及其解决之道

中文摘要

我们表明，网约车市场容易出现匹配失灵（“徒劳追逐”），即高需求引发一个有害的反馈循环——闲置司机少、接驾时间长、收入低，从而大幅降低福利。在从理论上刻画这些失灵并给出其相关性的经验证据之后，我们分析了平台如何避免这些失灵。提高价格可使需求重新回到可控范围。因此，平台既可以设定统一的高价，也可以在高需求时段采用高“峰时”定价，而在其他时段保持低价。对匹配算法的一些调整也能避免该问题，但峰时定价的表现优于这些调整。

Abstract

We show that ride-hailing markets are prone to a matching failure (“wild goose chases”) in which high demand sets off a harmful feedback cycle of few idle drivers, high pickup times, and low earnings, drastically reducing welfare. After characterizing these failures theoretically and showing empirical evidence of their relevance, we analyze how platforms can avoid them. Raising prices brings demand back under control. Platforms can thus set a uniform high price, or they can use high “surge” pricing during high demand times while keeping prices low at other times. Some adjustments to the matching algorithm can also avoid the problem, but surge pricing performs better than them.