中文摘要
市场设计为各类市场制度在配置稀缺资源方面的成败提供了管理层面的洞见。我们研究了一种在现实大学录取中使用的动态匹配机制, 在该机制中学生拥有共同的优先级排序。在理论上, 我们证明, 在假设存在充分的修正机会与理性的前提下, 有效且稳定的匹配能以任意高的概率出现。这预示着动态机制的稳定性低于延迟接受机制, 效率低于波士顿机制。我们在低复杂度的实验室环境中证实了这一预测。然而, 在高复杂度的环境中, 动态机制的稳定性与延迟接受机制相当, 效率与波士顿机制相当, 因为后两者在该环境中均表现不佳。这一发现表明, 动态机制对复杂性的上升具有更强的抵御能力。我们将这种韧性归因于其对可理性化策略的刻画不依赖于信念。除大学录取外, 动态机制在住房分配、工作分配和升价拍卖中也具有潜在应用价值。
Abstract
Market design provides managerial insights into the success and failure of various market institutions in allocating scarce resources. We investigate a dynamic matching mechanism used in real-world college admissions, where students share a common priority ranking. Theoretically, we prove that efficient and stable matching occurs with an arbitrarily high probability, assuming sufficient revision opportunities and rationality. This predicts that the dynamic mechanism is less stable than the deferred acceptance mechanism and less efficient than the Boston mechanism. We confirm this prediction in a low-complexity laboratory setting. However, in a high-complexity setting, the dynamic mechanism matches the stability of the deferred acceptance and the efficiency of the Boston mechanism, as both underperform in this setting. This finding indicates that the dynamic mechanism is more resilient to increased complexity. We attribute this resilience to its belief-independent characterization of rationalizable strategies. Beyond college admissions, the dynamic mechanism has potential applications in housing assignments, job allocations, and ascending auctions.