中文摘要
我们利用细分的美国数据和边界断点设计表明,更慷慨的失业保险 (UI) 政策会降低银行存款。我们检验了可能解释这一下降的若干渠道,发现的证据与家庭因预防性储蓄减少而减少存款持有量相一致。由于存款是银行最大且最稳定的资金来源,存款下降会影响银行放贷。在 UI 政策慷慨的州吸收存款的银行会减少对小企业的贷款供给。此外,由这些银行提供服务的县失业率更高、工资增长更低。
Abstract
We use disaggregated U.S. data and a border discontinuity design to show that more generous unemployment insurance (UI) policies lower bank deposits. We test several channels that could explain this decline and find evidence consistent with households lowering their deposit holdings due to reduced precautionary savings. Because deposits are the largest and most stable source of funding for banks, the decrease in deposits affects bank lending. Banks that raise deposits in states with generous UI policies reduce their loan supply to small businesses. Furthermore, counties that are served by these banks experience a higher unemployment rate and lower wage growth.