Management Science · 2025 · Heski Bar-Isaac、Justin P. Johnson、Volker Nocke
中文摘要
人们常认为,收购初创企业的唯一目的在于雇用专门人才。我们表明,此类收购式雇佣的目标可能是关闭劳动力市场上最相关的竞争对手。这使收购方获得对专门人才的买方垄断势力。其后果是,收购式雇佣可能损害员工利益并造成社会无效率。我们考察了这些效应的稳健性,模型中允许存在与在初创企业工作相关的私人收益、不同的议价协议、存在或不存在互补性的多名员工,以及私人信息。
Abstract
It is often argued that startups are acquired for the sole purpose of hiring specialized talent. We show that the goal of such acquihires might be to shut down the most relevant labor market competitor. This grants the acquirer monopsony power over specialized talent. As a consequence, acquihiring may harm employees and be socially inefficient. We explore the robustness of these effects, allowing for private benefits associated with working at a startup, varying bargaining protocols, multiple employees with and without complementarities, and private information.