中文摘要
数据分析使企业能够向目标消费者提供个性化价格，但这需要付出成本。我们研究一个竞争性个性化定价博弈，其中进入者不确定在位者的定向成本。我们证明，通过“标价—折扣”方案实施个性化定价，可以使在位者通过标价传递其定向成本信号。这一信号传递机制之所以有效，是因为标价充当价格上限，限制了在位者通过个性化折扣攫取消费者剩余的能力。高成本在位者可以策略性地将标价设定在完全信息水平以下，从而与低成本在位者区分开来。有趣的是，只有当在位者定向成本存在适度差异时，高成本在位者才更偏好分离而非混同。个性化定价对企业的影响可能不同，有利于在位者但损害进入者。关于定向成本的不对称信息削弱了高成本在位者提供个性化折扣的激励，导致总定向成本降低，并可能增加社会剩余。这些发现为针对个性化定价的政府监管和透明度政策提供了启示。
Abstract
Data analytics enable firms to offer personalized prices to targeted consumers but at a cost. We study a competitive personalized pricing game where the entrant is uncertain about the incumbent’s targeting cost. We demonstrate that implementing personalized pricing through a “list price-discount” scheme allows the incumbent to signal its targeting cost via the list price. This signaling mechanism is effective because the list price serves as a price ceiling, which limits the incumbent’s ability to extract consumer surplus through personalized discounts. The high-cost incumbent can strategically set its list price below the full-information level to separate itself from the low-cost incumbent. Interestingly, the high-cost incumbent prefers separating over pooling only when there is a moderate variation in the incumbents’ targeting costs. Personalized pricing can affect firms differently, benefiting the incumbent but hurting the entrant. Asymmetric information about targeting costs weakens the high-cost incumbent’s incentive to offer personalized discounts, resulting in lower total targeting costs and potentially increasing social surplus. These findings shed light on government regulations and transparency policies regarding personalized pricing.