Risk Taking Under Limited Liability and Moral Hazard: Quantifying the Role of Motivated Beliefs
中文摘要
本文研究有限责任与道德风险是否通过动机性信念影响风险承担。一方面，有限责任鼓励投资者承担过度风险。另一方面，在存在道德风险时，过度风险承担使投资者难以维持积极的自我形象。借助一种新颖的实验设计，我们表明受试者会形成动机性信念，为其过度风险承担进行自我辩护。对于同一投资机会，若其失败可能损害他人，受试者会投资更多，且对投资成功的预期显著更为乐观。我们表明，在有限责任下投资增加中有超过三分之一可通过动机性信念加以解释。此外，通过一项具有有限责任但无道德风险的处理，我们表明动机性信念是潜意识形成的，并可能导致如下悖论性结果：与投资不可能损害第三方的情形相比，当投资可能损害第三方时，投资者反而承担更大的风险。这些结果凸显了动机性信念在监管政策中的重要性，强调政策制定者不仅必须应对不良激励，还必须应对不良信念的作用。
Abstract
This paper investigates whether limited liability and moral hazard affect risk taking through motivated beliefs. On the one hand, limited liability encourages investors to take excessive risks. On the other, excessive risk taking makes it hard for investors to maintain a positive self-image when moral hazard is present. Using a novel experimental design, we show that subjects form motivated beliefs to self-justify their excessive risk taking. For the same investment opportunity, subjects invest more and are significantly more optimistic about the success of the investment if its failure can harm others. We show that more than one third of the investment increases under limited liability, and moral hazard can be explained through motivated beliefs. Moreover, through a treatment with limited liability but no moral hazard, we show that motivated beliefs are formed subconsciously and can lead to the paradoxical result of investors taking larger risks when their investment can harm a third party compared with when it cannot. These results underscore the importance of motivated beliefs in regulatory policy, emphasizing that policymakers must not only address bad incentives, but also address the role of bad beliefs.