中文摘要
我们考察商业秘密保护法对企业内部信息整合（即企业内部经济主体在多大程度上能够获取其他经济主体提供的决策相关信息）的影响。我们认为，更强的商业秘密保护法会增加企业的内部信息整合，因为它们降低了信息泄露的专有成本。为检验我们的预测，我们以企业各站点接入其企业管理系统的比例来衡量企业的内部信息整合程度。利用《统一商业秘密法》（UTSA）下商业秘密保护法的交错采纳，我们发现这些法律提高了企业的内部信息整合。对于专有成本较高（协调收益较高）的企业，这一效应更强（更弱）。进一步地，我们提供证据表明，UTSA所引致的内部信息整合提升转化为企业信息质量与决策质量的改善。综上所述，我们的结果增进了对塑造企业内部信息环境的经济权衡的理解。
Abstract
We examine the effect of trade secret protection laws on internal information integration (i.e., the extent to which economic agents are provided with access to decision-relevant information from other economic agents within a firm). We argue that stronger trade secret protection laws increase firms’ internal information integration because they reduce the proprietary costs of information leakage. To test our prediction, we measure a firm’s internal information integration by the share of its sites integrated into its enterprise management system. Exploiting the staggered adoption of trade secret protection laws via the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), we find that these laws increase firms’ internal information integration. This effect is stronger (weaker) for firms with higher proprietary costs (coordination benefits). Further, we provide evidence that the UTSA-induced increase in internal information integration translates into improvements of firms’ internal information quality and decision-making quality. Taken together, our results enhance the understanding of the economic trade-offs shaping firms’ internal information environment.