中文摘要
我们研究银行在向僵尸企业放贷时是否会内部化拥堵外部性。我们推测,在银行具有专业化的行业中,银行应当更了解僵尸企业的存在以及此类企业对健康借款人所施加的拥堵外部性,并表明银行对僵尸企业的信贷供给与其行业专业化程度负相关。当拥堵外部性可能产生更强不利影响时,即当僵尸企业在行业中占据更高比例的资源或当行业地理上更为集中时,这一关系更强。此外,在资产专用性较高的行业中,这一关系较弱,因为僵尸企业的违约(以及潜在的资产贱卖)可能降低健康借款人的抵押品价值。
Abstract
We study whether banks internalize congestion externalities when lending to zombie firms. We conjecture that banks should be better informed about the presence of zombie firms and the congestion externalities that such firms exert on healthy borrowers in industries where banks are specialized and show that banks’ credit supply to zombie firms relates negatively to their industry specialization. This relation is stronger when congestion externalities are likely to have stronger adverse effects, namely when zombie firms take a higher fraction of resources in the industry or when the industry is geographically more concentrated. Additionally, this relation is weaker in industries with higher asset specificity as zombie firms’ default (and potential asset fire sales) could reduce healthy borrowers’ collateral value.