Incentivizing Organ Donation Under Different Priority Rules: The Role of Information
Management Science · 2025 · Mengling Li、Yohanes E. Riyanto
中文摘要
本文考察在不同器官分配优先规则下登记死后器官捐献的激励，这些规则可能优先考虑已登记的捐献者和/或对器官移植估值较高的患者。具体而言，捐献者优先规则赋予先前登记为捐献者的人在器官等待名单上更高的优先级。双重激励优先规则先依据捐献者身份分配器官，再在同一捐献者身份内按个体估值排序；或者顺序相反，先按估值再按捐献者身份。理论与实验结果均表明，捐献者优先规则和双重激励优先规则的效果在很大程度上取决于信息环境。当器官移植估值在做出捐献决策之前不可观察时，混合型双重激励规则能产生更高的捐献率。相反，如果估值可观察，双重激励优先规则会在高估值与低估值个体之间造成激励失衡，从而可能削弱混合型双重激励规则在提高总体捐献率方面的效果。
Abstract
This paper examines the incentive to register for deceased organ donation under alternative organ allocation priority rules, which may prioritize registered donors and/or patients with higher valuations for organ transplantation. Specifically, the donor priority rule grants higher priority on the organ waiting list to those who have previously registered as donors. The dual-incentive priority rules allocate organs based on donor status, followed by individual valuations within the same donor status, or vice versa. Both theoretical and experimental results suggest that the efficacy of the donor priority rule and the dual-incentive priority rules critically depends on the information environment. When organ transplantation valuations are unobservable prior to making donation decisions, the hybrid dual-incentive rules generate higher donation rates. In contrast, if valuations are observable, the dual-incentive priority rules create unbalanced incentives between high- and low-value agents, potentially undermining the efficacy of the hybrid dual-incentive rules in increasing overall donation rates.