Deferred Tax Asset Revaluations, Costly Information Processing, and Bank Deposits: Evidence from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
中文摘要
我们考察信息处理成本如何影响存款人利用银行利润表中细节信息的程度。存款人具有独特的成本—收益结构：他们是财务信息的非专业使用者，信息处理成本较高。与此同时，迅速行动能给他们带来收益，因为濒临倒闭的银行按先到先得的原则付款。这使得他们很可能对诸如报告净收益这类显著的汇总指标作出反应，而不对分项项目中包含的任何与风险无关的信息进行调整。在实证分析中，我们考察由2017年《减税与就业法案》导致的递延所得税资产机械性重估所驱动的存款人行为。利用双重差分设计，我们发现存款人因这一与风险无关的信息而提取存款。在横截面检验中，我们表明，当信息获取成本较低而信息整合成本较高时，提取存款的行为更为强烈。总体而言，我们的结果表明，信息处理成本对于理解存款人对会计信息的反应十分重要，并且可能导致无法由新的风险相关信息解释的存款流动。
Abstract
We examine how information processing costs affect the extent to which depositors’ use the details in banks’ income statements. Depositors have a unique cost-benefit structure because they are nonprofessional users of financial information and have high information processing costs. At the same time, they benefit from acting quickly because failing banks make payments on a first-come, first-serve basis. This makes it likely that they will react to a prominent summary measure like the reported net income without adjusting for any risk-irrelevant information included in the line items. In our empirical analysis, we investigate depositors’ behavior as driven by the mechanical revaluations of deferred tax assets due to the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Using a difference-in-difference design, we find deposit withdrawals because of this risk-irrelevant information. In cross-sectional tests, we show that the withdrawals are stronger if the information acquisition costs are low, and the information integration costs are high. Overall, our results show that information processing costs are important for understanding depositors’ reactions to accounting information and can lead to deposit flows that cannot be explained by new risk-relevant information.