Sharpen Your Sword for Litigation: Incumbent Strategic Reaction to the Threat of Entry
中文摘要
尽管已有研究表明专利能够发挥进入壁垒的作用,但专利也会泄露在位企业的战略信息,并面临被宣告无效的风险。我们考察在位企业所面临的权衡:是在事前(ex ante)将专利用作威慑进入的工具,还是在竞争对手亮明意图之后于事后(ex post)加以使用。利用制药行业的独特特征——在该行业中,我们能够精确观察到竞争者进入威胁何时出现——并利用这一时点的外生变异,我们发现,在位企业会通过连续专利(continuation patents)有意地分割并推迟其知识产权的完整披露。在竞争者的进入威胁变得具体之后,在位企业会不成比例地披露更多连续专利,根据所受到的威胁调整应对策略,并通过诉讼成功推迟竞争者的进入。当在位企业受到攻击的药品价值较高,以及药品在美国食品药品监督管理局(FDA)批准时列名的专利范围相对较窄时,我们所识别出的在位企业反应更为强烈。
Abstract
While patents have been shown to play a role as barriers to entry, they also reveal information about incumbent strategies and risk being invalidated. We examine the trade-off incumbents face between using their patents ex ante as entry deterrents or ex post once competitors have revealed their moves. Leveraging the unique characteristics of the pharmaceutical sector, in which it is possible to observe exactly when a competitor entry threat materializes, and exploiting exogenous variation in that timing, we show that incumbents intentionally fragment and delay the full disclosure of their intellectual property rights through continuation patents. They disproportionately reveal continuation patents after a competitor entry threat becomes concrete, tailoring their response to the threat they have received and successfully delaying competitor entry through litigation. The detected incumbents’ reaction is stronger when their attacked drugs are valuable and when the patents listed at the Food and Drug Administration approval of a drug are relatively narrow in scope.