中文摘要
非裔美国人的就业持续时间短于条件相似的白人。我们假设雇主在获取或运用与能力相关的信息方面存在歧视。在我们的模型中,对黑人劳动者(而非白人劳动者)进行监督是自我延续的。新录用的黑人雇员更有可能在受监督后被前雇主解雇。这会降低企业对其能力的信念,从而激励歧视性监督。我们证实了如下预测:黑人劳动者最初的裁员率高于非黑人劳动者,但随着资历增长二者趋于收敛,且随武装部队资格测验(AFQT)成绩的提高,黑人劳动者裁员率下降的幅度更大。另外两项预测——黑人劳动者终生收入更低、失业持续时间更长——已有实证证据支持。
Abstract
African Americans face shorter employment durations than similar Whites. We hypothesise that employers discriminate in acquiring or acting on ability-relevant information. In our model, monitoring Black, but not White, workers is self-sustaining. New Black hires were more likely fired by previous employers after monitoring. This reduces firms’ beliefs about ability, incentivising discriminatory monitoring. We confirm our predictions that layoffs are initially higher for Black than non-Black workers, but that they converge with seniority and decline more with the Armed Forces Qualification Test for Black workers. Two additional predictions, lower lifetime incomes and longer unemployment durations for Black workers, have known empirical support.