中文摘要
我们提出了一种通过进入拥有共同客户基础的相邻市场来保护垄断地位的理论(即包络)。一家在其市场中占支配地位的企业进入数据丰富的二级市场,从事掠夺性定价和隐私政策搭售。我们将后者定义为:以订阅一项允许跨所有数据来源捆绑用户数据的隐私政策作为提供服务的条件。从二级市场获取数据为企业在数据密集的一级市场带来优势,使这家占支配地位的企业免受进入冲击,从而损害消费者。我们讨论了潜在的救济措施,包括数据解绑与数据可携带。
Abstract
We present a theory of monopoly protection by means of entry in adjacent markets that have a common customer base (i.e., envelopment). A firm dominant in its market enters a data-rich secondary market and engages in predatory pricing and privacy-policy tying. We define the latter as conditioning service provision to the subscription of a privacy policy that allows bundling of user data across all sources. Acquiring data from the secondary market confers an advantage in the data-intensive primary market that shields the dominant firm from entry, thus harming consumers. We discuss potential remedies, including data unbundling and portability.