中文摘要
我们利用新近关联的税收记录表明,英国公司所有者兼管理者对个人税的大幅反应源于跨期收入转移,而非实际经营活动的减少。约一半的收入转移是短期性的,有助于避免波动性收入在累进的个人所得税制下被课以更重的税。其余部分则反映了为利用更低税率(包括对资本利得的优惠待遇)而进行的长期系统性利润留存。我们没有发现证据表明这种由税收引致的留存会增加企业投资;但它确实大幅减少了从高收入企业所有者那里征得的税收收入。
Abstract
We use newly linked tax records to show that the large responses of UK company owner-managers to personal taxes are due to intertemporal income shifting and not to reductions in real business activity. Around half of this shifting is short-term and helps prevent volatile incomes being taxed more heavily under progressive personal taxes. The remainder reflects systemic profit retention over long periods to take advantage of lower tax rates, including preferential treatment of capital gains. We find no evidence that this tax-induced retention increases business investment. It does, however, substantially reduce the tax revenue raised from high income business owners.