重访价格与数量: 决策者制定庇古税和补贴需知什么？
Prices Versus Quantities Revisited: What Do Policymakers Need to Know to Set Pigouvian Taxes and Subsidies?
NBER Working Papers · 2026 · [{"name": "Denise Dipasquale", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Edward L. Glaeser", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Adam M. Guren", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Paul S. Willen", "affiliation": []}]
中文摘要
政策制定者需要哪些信息才能设计庇古税或补贴？标准逻辑表明，只需知道外部性的大小即可，而无需了解数量。然而，如果干预存在固定成本、税收产生无谓损失，或存在分配方面的关切，这一逻辑便是不正确的。我们提出一个模型，其中这些考虑因素可能使政策制定者了解均衡数量变得更有价值。我们将该模型应用于拥堵定价（其固定成本较高）以及波士顿一项拟议的住房补贴（涉及无谓损失和分配方面的关切）。
Abstract
What information do policymakers need to design Pigouvian taxes or subsidies? Standard logic suggests that it is sufficient to know the size of the externality and unnecessary to know about quantities. Yet this logic is incorrect if interventions have fixed costs, taxes create deadweight losses, or there are distributional concerns. We present a model in which these considerations can make it more valuable for policymakers to learn about equilibrium quantities. We apply the model to congestion pricing, which has high fixed costs, and to a proposed housing subsidy in Boston that features deadweight losses and distributional concerns.