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劳动力市场买方垄断势力与开放改革的动态收益

Labor Market Monopsony Power and the Dynamic Gains to Openness Reforms
International Economic Review · 2026 · Priyaranjan Jha、Antonio Rodriguez‐Lopez、Adam Spencer

中文摘要

我们将劳动力市场买方垄断嵌入一个包含出口、水平型FDI以及丰富企业生命周期动态的动态异质性企业一般均衡模型。买方垄断下边际成本的上升减缓并限制了在位企业为应对自由化而实现的增长,使调整转移到广延边际。经美国微观数据校准后,关税削减带来的福利收益在买方垄断下比完全劳动市场情形高出四倍以上。这一差异主要由转型路径上新出口企业的产生与企业进入所驱动。相比之下,降低对外FDI税收在买方垄断下会产生巨大的定量福利损失,因为企业开展FDI是为了逃避国内工资压力。

Abstract

ABSTRACT We embed labor market monopsony into a dynamic heterogeneous‐firm general equilibrium model with exporting, horizontal FDI, and rich firm lifecycle dynamics. Rising marginal costs with monopsony slow and limit incumbent firm growth in response to liberalization, shifting adjustment to the extensive margin. Calibrated to US micro data, welfare gains from tariff reduction are over four times larger under monopsony than with perfect labor markets. The difference is mostly driven by new exporter creation and firm entry along the transition path. By contrast, lowering outward FDI taxes gives powerful quantitative welfare losses under monopsony, as firms undertake FDI to escape domestic wage pressure.
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