Review of Economic Dynamics · 2025 · Shisham Adhikari、Athanasios Geromichalos、Ateş Gürsoy、Ioannis Kospentaris
中文摘要
工人职业生涯的第一步往往格外艰难。许多招聘企业要求具备相关领域的工作经验,由此形成一个恶性循环:为了获得一份入门级工作,必须先拥有一份入门级工作。因此,新进入劳动者的就职率低于过去曾找过工作的失业者,失业持续时间也更长。为研究这些现象的福利含义,我们考虑DMP模型的一个版本,其中与新进入劳动者匹配的企业必须承担培训成本。结果是,企业对新进入劳动者存在偏见,后者因此长期处于失业状态,并暴露于持续的技能损失冲击之下。我们使用校准后的模型,对四种政府干预的有效性进行定量评估,这些干预的共同目标是减少对新进入劳动者的偏见。我们发现,最有效的干预采取补贴形式,促使企业将新进入劳动者排在有经验劳动者之上,而且这一政策使经济非常接近受约束的有效结果。
Abstract
The first step in a worker's career is often particularly hard. Many firms seeking workers require experience in a related field, so a vicious circle is created, whereby an entry level job is required in order to get an entry level job. Consequently, entrant workers have lower job-finding rates and longer unemployment durations than the unemployed who have looked for a job in the past. To study the welfare implications of these observations, we consider a version of the DMP model where firms who match with entrant workers have to incur training costs. As a result, firms are biased against entrant workers, who, in turn, stay unemployed for a prolonged period of time, exposing themselves to a persistent skill loss shock. We use a calibrated version of the model to quantitatively assess the effectiveness of four government interventions whose common goal is to reduce bias against entrant workers. We find that the most effective intervention takes the form of a subsidy that induces firms to rank entrants higher than experienced workers and that this policy brings the economy very close to the constrained efficient outcome.