通过信息进行的市场细分
Market Segmentation through Information
Review of Economic Studies · 2026 · [{"name": "Matthew Elliott", "affiliation": ["University of Cambridge"]}, {"name": "Andrea Galeotti", "affiliation": ["London Business School"]}, {"name": "Ae-Ran Koh", "affiliation": ["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"]}, {"name": "Wenhao Li", "affiliation": ["University of Hong Kong"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 我们探讨关于消费者偏好的精确信息赋予中介在塑造竞争方面的力量。我们将中介视为一种信息设计者, 由其选择向企业披露何种信息, 而企业随后在差异化产品市场中进行伯特朗 (Bertrand) 式竞争。我们分析了使消费者剩余和生产者剩余最大化的信息设计, 并揭示了信息在强化或缓和竞争这两种用途上的系统性差异。我们的分析展示了用户数据能够赋予中介的力量, 并直接回应了当前有关数字市场的监管辩论。
Abstract
Abstract We explore the power that precise information about consumers’ preferences grants an intermediary in shaping competition. We think of an intermediary as an information designer who chooses what information to reveal to firms, which then compete à la Bertrand in a differentiated product market. We analyze the information designs that maximize consumer and producer surplus and uncover systematic differences in how information can be used to intensify or soften competition. Our analysis demonstrates the power that users’ data can endow intermediaries with and speaks directly to current regulatory debates regarding digital marketplaces.