← ireadpaper · 顶刊中的公共政策研究

主权风险下的财政刺激

Fiscal Stimulus under Sovereign Risk
Journal of Political Economy · 2023 · Javier Bianchi、Pablo Ottonello、Ignacio Presno

中文摘要

当政府面临主权风险时,应对衰退的最优财政政策是什么?我们在一个包含名义刚性的内生主权违约模型中研究这一问题。在衰退中增加支出会降低失业,但会使政府面临债务危机。我们定量分析了刺激与紧缩之间的这一权衡,发现扩大政府支出可能是不可取的,即使在存在可观的凯恩斯式稳定收益和不平等关切的情况下也是如此。与这些发现相一致,我们表明主权风险是世界各国普遍观察到的财政顺周期性的关键驱动因素。

Abstract

What is the optimal fiscal policy response to a recession when the government is subject to sovereign risk? We study this question in a model of endogenous sovereign default with nominal rigidities. Increasing spending in a recession reduces unemployment, but it exposes the government to a debt crisis. We quantitatively analyze this trade-off between stimulus and austerity and find that expanding government spending may be undesirable, even in the presence of sizable Keynesian stabilization gains and inequality concerns. Consistent with these findings, we show that sovereign risk is a key driver of the fiscal procyclicality observed worldwide.
在 ireadpaper 查看全部 →