Bank Market Power and Central Bank Digital Currency: Theory and Quantitative Assessment
Journal of Political Economy · 2022 · Jonathan Chiu、Seyed Mohammadreza Davoodalhosseini、Janet Hua Jiang、Yu Zhu
中文摘要
本文构建了一个具有微观基础的一般均衡支付模型,研究央行数字货币 (CBDC) 对私人银行中介业务的影响。如果银行在存款市场上拥有市场势力,央行数字货币可以增强竞争,提高存款利率,扩大中介业务,并增加产出。对美国经济的校准表明,央行数字货币可使银行贷款增加 1.57%,产出增加 0.19%。在考虑银行内生进入之后,这些挤入效应依然稳健,只是幅度有所减小。我们还在现金使用不断减少的背景下评估了不计息央行数字货币的作用。
Abstract
This paper develops a micro-founded general equilibrium model of payments to study the impact of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) on intermediation of private banks. If banks have market power in the deposit market, a CBDC can enhance competition, raising the deposit rate, expanding intermediation, and increasing output. A calibration to the US economy suggests that a CBDC can raise bank lending by 1.57% and output by 0.19%. These crowding-in effects remain robust, albeit with smaller magnitudes, after taking into account endogenous bank entry. We also assess the role of a non-interest-bearing CBDC as the use of cash declines.