议价价格下空间差异化产品市场中的竞争
Competition in a Spatially-Differentiated Product Market with Negotiated Prices
Review of Economic Studies · 2026 · [{"name": "Walter Beckert", "affiliation": ["Institute for Fiscal Studies", "Birkbeck, University of London"]}, {"name": "Howard W. Smith", "affiliation": ["Institute for Fiscal Studies"]}, {"name": "Yuya Takahashi", "affiliation": ["University of Washington"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 在许多市场中, 买方在差异化产品之间作出离散选择, 并就特定于该选择的价格进行谈判。我们为估计这类市场开发了一个模型, 该模型与买方和相互竞争的卖方之间讨价还价的非合作模型一致。我们表明, 当买方效用具有广义极值(GEV)扰动时, 该模型具有易于处理的似然函数, 可用于包含所选产品及其价格的交易层面数据。我们使用英国砖业的数据估计该模型, 并用其衡量市场势力和分析兼并。我们分析了空间差异化和所有权集中度如何影响市场势力在交易间的分布。在反事实分析中, 我们发现, 从逐笔单独谈判定价转向统一定价会使加价率和兼并价格效应平均上升, 但对少数交易而言则下降。
Abstract
Abstract In many markets, buyers make discrete choices between differentiated products and negotiate prices that are specific to the choice. We develop for estimation a model for this class of markets which is consistent with non-cooperative models of bargaining between a buyer and competing sellers. We show that when the buyer's utility has GEV disturbances, the model has a tractable likelihood function which can be used with transaction-level data giving the selected product and its price. We estimate the model using data from the UK brick industry and use it to measure market power and analyze mergers. We analyze how spatial differentiation and ownership concentration affect the distribution of market power across transactions. In counterfactuals we find that switching from individually-negotiated to uniform pricing causes markups, and merger price effects, to increase on average but to decrease for a minority of transactions.