管理者与公立医院绩效
Managers and Public Hospital Performance
American Economic Review · 2025 · [{"name": "Pablo Muñoz", "affiliation": ["Universidad de Los Andes, Chile"]}, {"name": "Cristóbal Otero", "affiliation": []}]
中文摘要
我们研究在公共卫生领域中，管理者的质量是否会影响公共服务供给。利用智利公立医院的新数据，我们表明，引入公立医院首席执行官（CEO）竞争性招聘制度并提高其薪酬，如何使医院死亡率降低了8%。这一效应无法由患者构成的变化来解释。我们发现，该政策改变了CEO人才库的构成，以学习过管理学的CEO取代了没有管理培训背景的医生。生产率的提升由招聘到更高质量CEO的医院所驱动。（JEL D24, G34, I11, I18, J45, M54, O15）
Abstract
We study whether the quality of managers can affect public service provision in the context of public health. Using novel data from public hospitals in Chile, we show how the introduction of a competitive recruitment system and better pay for public hospital CEOs reduced hospital mortality by 8 percent. The effect is not explained by a change in patient composition. We find that the policy changed the pool of CEOs by displacing doctors with no management training in favor of CEOs who had studied management. Productivity improvements were driven by hospitals that recruited higher quality CEOs. (JEL D24, G34, I11, I18, J45, M54, O15)