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作为组织问题的国家能力

State Capacity as an Organizational Problem
Review of Economic Studies · 2026 · [{"name": "Nicola Mastrorocco", "affiliation": ["University of Bologna"]}, {"name": "Edoardo Teso", "affiliation": ["Center for Economic and Policy Research"]}]

中文摘要

摘要 我们研究了降低中央当局监督成本的技术如何塑造了从小型家产制国家向大型官僚组织的历史转型。我们的分析基于一个新数据集, 该数据集追踪了19世纪美国联邦政府组织结构与地理分布的变化。为识别因果效应, 我们提出了一种新的识别策略, 利用铁路网络的扩张作为华盛顿特区与其他地点之间旅行时间(从而监督成本)差异的来源。我们得到三个主要发现。第一, 前往华盛顿特区旅行时间的缩短显著提高了联邦政府在某地存在的可能性。第二, 对于委托代理问题更严重的职业和任务, 这一效应更强。第三, 前往华盛顿特区旅行时间的缩短与该地联邦政府家产制特征的减弱相关, 这与监督能力增强会降低对个人信任和关系的依赖相一致。

Abstract

Abstract We investigate how technologies that reduce the costs of monitoring by central authorities have shaped the historical transition from small patrimonial states to large bureaucratic organizations. Our analysis is based on a novel dataset that traces changes in the organizational structure and geographic presence of the U.S. federal government over the nineteenth century. To identify causal effects, we develop a new identification strategy that exploits the expansion of the railroad network as a source of variation in the travel time–and thus monitoring costs–between Washington D.C. and other locations. We present three main findings. First, reductions in travel time to Washington D.C. significantly increased the likelihood of federal government presence in a location. Second, this effect is stronger for occupations and tasks characterized by more severe agency problems. Third, decreases in travel time to Washington D.C. are associated with a decline in patrimonial features of the federal government in the location, in line with enhanced monitoring capacity reducing dependence on personal trust and connections.
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