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执法薄弱下的企业所得税

Corporate Taxation under Weak Enforcement
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2021 · Pierre Jean Bachas、Mauricio Soto

中文摘要

发展中国家应如何对企业所得征税?我们在哥斯达黎加研究这一问题,该国企业当收入小幅增加时,其利润适用的平均税率更高。我们结合断点回归与聚束设计,估计应税利润弹性,并将其分解为收入弹性与成本弹性。我们发现,面对更高税率的企业会小幅降低收入,但会大幅增加成本,从而产生3—5的较大应税利润弹性。在此背景下,对企业利润征税的收入最大化税率低于25%,并且我们表明,一项在降低税率的同时扩大税基的税收政策,几乎可以使从这些企业征收的税收收入翻倍。

Abstract

How should developing countries tax corporate income? We study this question in Costa Rica, where firms face higher average tax rates on profits when revenues marginally increase. We combine discontinuity and bunching designs to estimate the elasticity of taxable profit and separate it into revenue and cost elasticities. We find that firms faced with a higher tax rate slightly reduce revenues but considerably increase costs, thus producing a large elasticity of taxable profit of 3–5. In this context, the revenue-maximizing rate for a corporate tax on profit is below 25 percent, and we show that a tax policy that broadens the base while lowering the rate can almost double the tax revenue collected from these firms.
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