Journal of Public Economics · 2021 · Daniel Fernández-Kranz、Núria Rodríguez-Planas
中文摘要
我们采用带个体固定效应的双重差分模型，评估西班牙1999年一项法律的效果：该法律给予因家庭责任而申请缩短工作周的、有6岁以下子女的劳动者以就业保护。我们的分析表明，初衷良好的政策可能适得其反，加剧男女之间的劳动力市场不平等，因为该政策的利用存在很强的性别差异，通常只有女性会申请非全日制工作。该法律颁布后，雇主雇用育龄女性的可能性降低了49%，与育龄女性解除雇佣关系的可能性提高了40%，将育龄女性晋升为长期合同员工的可能性降低了37%，相对于同年龄男性，女性非就业率提高了4%至8%。以不受该法律影响的较年长女性作为对照组，结果相似。此外，该法律惩罚了所有育龄女性，甚至包括那些没有子女的女性。这些效应在低技能岗位、员工少于10人的企业以及非全日制劳动者较少的行业中最大。这些发现对多项敏感性分析和安慰剂检验均稳健。
Abstract
We use a difference-in-differences model with individual fixed effects to evaluate a 1999 Spanish law granting employment protection to workers with children younger than 6 who had asked for a shorter workweek due to family responsibilities. Our analysis shows that well-intended policies can potentially backfire and aggravate labor market inequalities between men and women, since there is a very gendered take-up, with only women typically requesting part-time work. After the law was enacted, employers were 49% less likely to hire women of childbearing age, 40% more likely to separate from them, and 37% less likely to promote them to permanent contracts, increasing female non-employment by 4% to 8% relative to men of similar age. The results are similar using older women unaffected by the law as a comparison group. Moreover, the law penalized all women of childbearing age, even those who did not have children. These effects were largest in low-skill jobs, at firms with less than 10 employees, and in industries with few part-time workers. These findings are robust to several sensitivity analyses and placebo tests.