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市场势力与所得税

Market Power and Income Taxation
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2021 · Louis Kaplow

中文摘要

本文在一个包含多部门、异质性能力、内生劳动供给与非线性所得税的模型中,分析了关于市场势力与不平等的担忧。在不存在利润耗散的情形下,比例加成对经济没有影响;而一项降低非比例加成的政策,当该加成高于(低于)其他加成的加权平均时,会提高(降低)福利。在存在比例(部分或完全)利润耗散时,比例加成等价于能力分布的向下平移,且尽管存在对分配与劳动供给扭曲的顾虑,带有非比例加成的最优政策规则仍使消费者剩余与生产者剩余之和最大化。

Abstract

This article analyzes concerns about market power and inequality in a model with multiple sectors, heterogeneous abilities, endogenous labor supply, and nonlinear income taxation. Proportional markups with no profit dissipation have no effect on the economy, and a policy that reduces a nonproportional markup raises (lowers) welfare when it is higher (lower) than a weighted average of other markups. With proportional (partial or full) profit dissipation, proportional markups are equivalent to a downward shift of the distribution of abilities, and the optimal policy rule with nonproportional markups maximizes consumer plus producer surplus despite concerns for distribution and labor supply distortion.
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