Credit Rationing and Pass-Through in Supply Chains: Theory and Evidence from Bangladesh
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2021 · M. Shahe Emran、Dilip Mookherjee B、Forhad J. Shilpi、Md. Helal Uddin
中文摘要
贸易商常因价格高企而受到指责,并由此促使政府实施规制。我们研究了2011–2012年间孟加拉国政府禁止食用油供应链中一层融资中介的影响。与标准寡头供应链模型的预测相反,该禁令导致下游批发价和零售价上涨,而进口原油价格变动的传导率下降。这些结果可以通过将标准模型扩展以纳入贸易信贷摩擦来解释:在该框架下,中介机构拓宽了下游贸易商的信贷可得性。
Abstract
Traders are often blamed for high prices, prompting government regulation. We study the effects of a government ban of a layer of financing intermediaries in edible oil supply chain in Bangladesh during 2011–2012. Contrary to the predictions of a standard model of an oligopolistic supply chain, the ban caused downstream wholesale and retail prices to rise, and pass-through of the changes in imported crude oil price to fall. These results can be explained by an extension of the standard model to incorporate trade credit frictions, where intermediaries expand credit access of downstream traders.