Informal Labor and the Efficiency Cost of Social Programs: Evidence from Unemployment Insurance in Brazil
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2021 · François Gerard、Gustavo Gonzaga
中文摘要
人们普遍认为,大规模非正规部门的存在会提高发展中国家社会项目的效率成本。我们通过将最优失业保险框架与来自巴西的全面数据相结合,针对失业保险(UI)的情形评估了这类观点。利用潜在失业保险期限的准实验变异,我们为通常的道德风险问题——即失业保险削弱了重返正式工作的激励——找到了明确的证据。然而,与之相关的效率成本低于美国,且在巴西境内非正规程度更高的劳动力市场中更低。这是因为非正规程度较高的地方,其正式再就业率本来就较低,因而在不存在任何道德风险的情况下,会有更大比例的劳动者领取失业保险金。总之,随着经济走向正规化,效率方面的考量实际上可能变得愈发重要。
Abstract
It is widely believed that the presence of a large informal sector increases the efficiency cost of social programs in developing countries. We evaluate such claims for the case of unemployment insurance (UI) by combining an optimal UI framework with comprehensive data from Brazil. Using quasi-experimental variation in potential UI duration, we find clear evidence for the usual moral hazard problem that UI reduces incentives to return to a formal job. Yet, the associated efficiency cost is lower than it is in the United States, and it is lower in labor markets with higher informality within Brazil. This is because formal reemployment rates are lower to begin with where informality is higher, so that a larger share of workers would draw UI benefits absent any moral hazard. In sum, efficiency concerns may actually become more relevant as an economy formalizes.