中文摘要
本文考察了第三方(世界银行)在印度进行干预的政治经济学后果。该干预是一项能力建设举措,在一个村庄样本中对地方政治人物就各类治理程序进行培训。我们表明,邦政府对这一干预的反应是向在任者与邦执政党派一致的项目村额外分配资源。其结果是,项目村中反对党现任者转投执政党的比例显著上升。此外,由于该干预,反对党现任者的连任率下降,尤其是那些未转换党派的现任者。这些结果凸显了考虑此类干预之政治经济学后果的重要性,即便在并不高度依赖外国援助的国家也是如此,以便更好地理解其总体福利效应。
Abstract
The paper examines political economy consequences of a third party (World Bank) intervention in India. The intervention was a capacity building initiative that trained local politicians in various governance procedures in a sample of villages. We show that the state government reacted to the intervention by allocating additional resources to program villages with aligned incumbents. Consequently, party switching by opposition incumbents in favor of the ruling party went up significantly in program villages. Moreover, the reelection rate of opposition party incumbents went down due to the intervention, especially for those who didn’t switch parties. The results highlight the importance of considering political economy consequences of such interventions, even in countries not heavily reliant on foreign assistance, to better understand their overall welfare effects.