Unemployment Insurance Taxes and Labor Demand: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Administrative Data
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2021 · Andrew C. Johnston
中文摘要
为失业保险融资,各州对实施裁员的雇主提高工资税率。因此,企业在经济下行之后面临的税率最高,这可能阻碍劳动力市场的复苏。利用佛罗里达州的全人口行政记录,我借助税表中的回归拐点设计估计了这些税率上升对企业行为的影响。税率上升大幅降低了招聘和就业,而对裁员或工资没有影响。结果表明,这一融资制度存在未预料到的成本,其使最优救济金降低了四分之一,并解释了大衰退之后失业的12%。
Abstract
To finance unemployment insurance, states raise payroll tax rates on employers who engage in layoffs. Tax rates are, therefore, highest for firms after downturns, potentially hampering labor-market recovery. Using full-population, administrative records from Florida, I estimate the effect of these tax increases on firm behavior leveraging a regression kink design in the tax schedule. Tax hikes reduce hiring and employment substantially, with no effect on layoffs or wages. The results imply unanticipated costs of the financing regime which reduce the optimal benefit by a quarter and account for 12 percent of the unemployment in the wake of the Great Recession.