American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2021 · Mathias Reynaert、James M. Sallee
中文摘要
企业有时会通过操纵政策所依据的指标来满足矫正外部性政策的要求。这会因侵蚀信息而损害买方利益, 但当成本节约被转嫁至价格时, 买方又会从中受益。我们构建了一个凸显这一张力的模型, 并用它来分析欧盟汽车碳排放评级中的操纵行为。我们利用新颖的数据记录了操纵行为的惊人增长。随后, 我们在校准模拟中分析了操纵的影响。在广泛的参数范围内, 我们发现成本转嫁的影响远超信息扭曲; 就净效果而言, 买方从操纵中获益, 即使他们被操纵所蒙骗。
Abstract
Firms sometimes comply with externality-correcting policies by gaming the measure that determines policy. This harms buyers by eroding information, but it benefits them when cost savings are passed through into prices. We develop a model that highlights this tension and use it to analyze gaming of automobile carbon emission ratings in the EU. We document startling increases in gaming using novel data. We then analyze the effects of gaming in calibrated simulations. Over a wide range of parameters, we find that pass-through substantially outweighs information distortions; on net, buyers benefit from gaming, even when they are fooled by it.