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提高印度拉贾斯坦邦的警察绩效: 关于激励、管理自主权与培训的实验证据

Improving Police Performance in Rajasthan, India: Experimental Evidence on Incentives, Managerial Autonomy, and Training
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2021 · Abhijit Banerjee、Raghabendra Chattopadhyay、Esther Duflo、Daniel Keniston、Nina Singh

中文摘要

管理对企业至关重要, 但在层级制的政府组织中, 哪些管理实践是最优的? 能干的管理者能否识别出这些实践? 本文利用在印度拉贾斯坦邦警察部门开展的一项大规模随机试验, 检验了高级警官推荐的四项干预措施: 限制人员调动、值班与休班的轮换、加强社区参与以及在岗培训。实地经验促成了第五项干预: 由调查员进行"诱饵"式造访以登记案件, 借此激励警员改善服务。只有培训和"诱饵"式造访产生了稳健的影响; 其余措施执行不力且没有效果。管理改革可以改善警务工作, 但即便是能干的领导者也难以识别最优的干预措施。

Abstract

Management matters for firms, but what practices are optimal in hierarchical government organizations? And can skilled managers identify them? A large-scale randomized trial conducted with the police of Rajasthan, India, tested four interventions recommended by senior police officers: limitations of transfers, rotation of duties and days off, increased community involvement, and on-duty training. Field experience motivated a fifth intervention: “decoy” visits by enumerators to register cases, incentivizing staff to improve service. Only training and decoy visits had robust impacts; others were poorly implemented and ineffective. Management reforms can improve policing, but even skilled leaders struggle to identify the optimal interventions.
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