中文摘要
本文考察了为抢先发表并由此确立优先权而展开的竞争如何影响科学研究的质量。我们首先构建一个模型，其中科学家决定是否以及在一个给定项目上工作多长时间。在决定应让项目成熟多久时，科学家需要权衡更高质量研究带来的边际收益与被他人抢先的边际风险。科学潜力最高的项目竞争最为激烈，因为它们会诱发最多的进入者。因此，该模型预测这些项目也最为仓促、质量最低。我们利用蛋白质数据库（Protein Data Bank, PDB）——一个大型大分子结构存储库——中的结构生物学数据，检验了该模型的预测。PDB 的一个重要特征是，它会为每个结构分配客观的科学质量度量指标。正如模型所预示的，我们发现事前潜力更高的结构会引发更多竞争、完成速度更快、且质量更低。与模型的预测一致，也与将我们的实证结果作因果解释相一致的是：当我们聚焦于那些——因其就业岗位性质——较少关注发表与优先权的科学家所提交的结构时，上述关系均有所减弱。我们估计，自 PDB 于 1971 年成立以来，改进这些低质量结构所需付出的成本介于 15 亿至 88 亿美元之间。
Abstract
Abstract This article investigates how competition to publish first and thereby establish priority affects the quality of scientific research. We begin by developing a model where scientists decide whether and how long to work on a given project. When deciding how long they should let their projects mature, scientists trade off the marginal benefit of higher-quality research against the marginal risk of being preempted. Projects with the highest scientific potential are the most competitive because they induce the most entry. Therefore, the model predicts these projects are also the most rushed and lowest quality. We test the predictions of this model in the field of structural biology using data from the Protein Data Bank (PDB), a repository for structures of large macromolecules. An important feature of the PDB is that it assigns objective measures of scientific quality to each structure. As suggested by the model, we find that structures with higher ex ante potential generate more competition, are completed faster, and are lower quality. Consistent with the model, and with a causal interpretation of our empirical results, these relationships are mitigated when we focus on structures deposited by scientists who—by nature of their employment position—are less focused on publication and priority. We estimate that the costs associated with improving these low-quality structures are between $1.5 and $8.8 billion since the PDB’s founding in 1971.