中文摘要
自1980年以来，管理者薪酬大幅上升，管理者薪酬的不平等程度也随之加剧。同一时期，市场势力急剧上升。我们的出发点是：管理者的作用在于提高企业生产率。当市场处于不完全竞争状态时，生产率不仅有助于企业规模扩大，还会影响市场势力。我们建模分析产品市场的不完全竞争如何影响管理者薪酬，并分解企业规模与市场势力对薪酬的贡献。我们发现，平均而言，市场势力占管理者总薪酬的45.2%。值得注意的是，不同管理者之间存在显著差异。顶层管理者不成比例地受雇于拥有市场势力的企业，并从中获益：2019年，顶层管理者薪酬的80.3%可归因于市场势力。我们的主要结论是，市场势力的上升解释了管理者平均薪酬增长的一半，以及管理者薪酬不平等加剧的几乎全部。
Abstract
Abstract Manager pay has increased considerably since 1980, and so has inequality in manager pay. Over the same period, there has been a sharp rise in market power. We start from the premise that the role of managers is to increase firm productivity. When markets are imperfectly competitive, productivity not only helps firm grow in size, productivity also affects market power. We model how imperfect competition in product markets affects manager pay, and break down the contributions of firm size and market power to compensation. We find that market power, on average, accounts for 45.2% of total manager pay. Notably, there is substantial variation across managers. Top managers are disproportionately employed by firms with market power, and they benefit from it: in 2019, 80.3% of top manager pay is attributable to market power. Our main conclusion is that rise of market power explains half of the increase in average manager pay, and nearly all of the increase in manager pay inequality.