教师劳动力市场政策与次优理论
Teacher Labor Market Policy and the Theory of the Second Best
Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2024 · [{"name": "Michael D. Bates", "affiliation": ["University of California, Riverside"]}, {"name": "Michael Dinerstein", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research"]}, {"name": "Andrew C. Johnston", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research", "University of California, Merced"]}, {"name": "Isaac Sorkin", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research", "Stanford University"]}]
中文摘要
我们利用美国北卡罗来纳州一个大型城市学区中教师申请与校长评分的丰富数据，估计了一个教师与小学之间的匹配模型。教师和校长的偏好均偏离了能够最大化经济弱势学生成绩的偏好：教师偏好弱势学生较少的学校，而校长评分与教师效能的关系较弱。在均衡状态下，这两种偏离共同作用，产生了一个出人意料地公平的当前配置，即教师质量在优势学生与弱势学生之间保持平衡。为缩小成绩差距，仅针对一方偏离的政策无效或有害，而同时针对双方偏离的政策则可能显著提高弱势学生的成绩。
Abstract
Abstract We estimate a matching model of teachers and elementary schools with rich data on teachers' applications and principals' ratings from a large, urban district in North Carolina. Both teachers’ and principals’ preferences deviate from those that would maximize the achievement of economically disadvantaged students: teachers prefer schools with fewer disadvantaged students, and principals' ratings are weakly related to teacher effectiveness. In equilibrium, these two deviations combine to produce a surprisingly equitable current allocation, where teacher quality is balanced across advantaged and disadvantaged students. To close achievement gaps, policies that address deviations on one side alone are ineffective or harmful, while policies that address both could substantially increase the achievement of disadvantaged students.