雇主信用审查：贫困陷阱还是匹配效率
Employer Credit Checks: Poverty Traps Versus Matching Efficiency
Review of Economic Studies · 2024 · [{"name": "Dean Corbae", "affiliation": ["University of Wisconsin–Madison"]}, {"name": "Andrew Glover", "affiliation": ["Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 我们构建了一个框架，将就业前信用筛查理解为来自信贷市场的一种信号，该信号缓解了劳动力市场中的逆向选择。在我们的理论中，个体在两方面存在差异：一是债务违约倾向，二是其为雇佣企业创造的利润；在我们校准的经济中，高生产率工人的违约概率较低。这使企业为信用良好者创造更多工作岗位，从而形成贫困陷阱：信用不良的失业工人找到工作的概率较低，但没有工作又无法改善其信用。这表现为工资现值的内生性损失，而在消费者违约的定量模型中，这种损失通常被视为外生。禁止雇主进行信用检查消除了贫困陷阱，但会将求职者混同，降低匹配效率：高生产率工人的平均失业持续时间增加2天，而低生产率工人的平均失业持续时间减少13天。
Abstract
Abstract We develop a framework to understand pre-employment credit screening as a signal from credit markets that alleviates adverse selection in labour markets. In our theory, people differ in both their propensity to default on debt and the profits they create for firms that employ them; in our calibrated economy, highly productive workers have a low default probability. This leads firms to create more jobs for those with good credit, which creates a poverty trap: an unemployed worker with poor credit has a low job finding rate, but cannot improve her credit without a job. This manifests as an endogenous loss in present-discounted wages that is typically taken as exogenous in quantitative models of consumer default. Banning employer credit checks eliminates the poverty trap, but pools job seekers and reduces matching efficiency: average unemployment duration rises by 2 days for high productivity workers and falls by 13 days for low-productivity workers.