帮派统治：理解与反制犯罪治理
Gang Rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance
Review of Economic Studies · 2024 · [{"name": "Christopher Blattman", "affiliation": ["University of Chicago"]}, {"name": "Gustavo Duncan", "affiliation": ["Universidad EAFIT"]}, {"name": "Benjamin Lessing", "affiliation": ["University of Chicago"]}, {"name": "Santiago Tobón", "affiliation": ["Universidad EAFIT"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 犯罪集团治理着全球数百万人。即便在强国家中，帮派也会解决纠纷并提供安全。为何会出现这种强制力的双寡头格局？通常，帮派填补官方权力真空，这表明增加国家存在应会挤出犯罪治理。然而，我们表明，国家统治与帮派统治可能是战略互补的。具体而言，帮派可能通过维持社区秩序与忠诚来最小化查缴和逮捕。若确实如此，增加国家存在可能会提高帮派统治的激励。在哥伦比亚麦德林，犯罪头目告诉我们，他们进行统治是为了保护毒品租金免受警察侵扰。我们利用地理断点检验帮派对国家存在的反应。1987年的内部边界调整，使得一些街区在此后三十年间距离国家安全力量更近或更远。外生地更接近国家存在的帮派，随着时间推移发展出更多治理。它们主要在潜在毒品租金最高的社区这样做。这为对抗犯罪治理提出了新策略。
Abstract
Abstract Criminal groups govern millions worldwide. Even in strong states, gangs resolve disputes and provide security. Why do these duopolies of coercion emerge? Often, gangs fill vacuums of official power, suggesting that increasing state presence should crowd out criminal governance. We show, however, that state and gang rule can be strategic complements. In particular, gangs could minimize seizures and arrests by keeping neighbourhoods orderly and loyal. If true, increasing state presence could increase incentives for gang rule. In Medellín, Colombia, criminal leaders told us they rule to protect drug rents from police. We test gang responses to state presence using a geographic discontinuity. Internal border changes in 1987 assigned blocks to be closer or further from state security for three decades. Gangs exogenously closer to state presence developed more governance over time. They primarily did so in neighbourhoods with the greatest potential drug rents. This suggests new strategies for countering criminal governance.