中文摘要
我们研究一个长期限的寡头市场，其需求受到随机冲击，这些冲击可被两家具有有限容量的储存运营商所套利。该问题适用于任何可储存的商品——也就是大多数商品。由于套利价差对市场势力极为敏感，储存运营商面临强烈的激励，通过默契合谋来限制数量。由于他们必须采取多种行动——卖出、买入或两者兼施——这种合作呈现出新的形式。我们构造了该随机博弈的收益最大化均衡，并揭示了一种新型的部分合作，它在数量与延迟之间进行权衡。尽管属于合谋，部分合作因市场势力效应而带来更高的消费者剩余。当市场势力足够大时，正面竞争并不总是长期限博弈的均衡。我们据此提出政策含义，并指出竞争不足的储存是标的商品（例如可再生能源）发展的负外部性。
Abstract
ABSTRACT We study a long‐horizon, oligopolistic market with random shocks to demand that can be arbitraged by two storage operators with finite capacity. This problem applies to any storable commodity—that is, most commodities. Because the arbitrage spread is so sensitive to market power, storage operators face strong incentives to restrain quantities by tacitly colluding. This cooperation takes new forms thanks to the multiplicity of actions they must take: selling, buying, or both. We construct payoff‐maximizing equilibria of this stochastic game, and uncover a new form of Partial Cooperation that trades off quantities and delay. While collusive, Partial Cooperation delivers higher consumer surplus thanks to the market power effect. Head‐on competition is not always an equilibrium of the long‐horizon game when market power becomes large enough. We draw implications for policy and suggest poorly competitive storage is a negative externality to the development of the underlying commodity—for example, renewable energy.