“你将会”：数字广告的宏观经济学分析
“You Will:” A Macroeconomic Analysis of Digital Advertising
Review of Economic Studies · 2024 · [{"name": "Jeremy Greenwood", "affiliation": ["California University of Pennsylvania"]}, {"name": "Yueyuan Ma", "affiliation": ["University of California, Santa Barbara"]}, {"name": "Mehmet Yörükoğlu", "affiliation": ["Koç University"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 本文构建了一个基于信息的模型，其中传统广告与数字广告为免费媒体产品的供给提供资金，并影响价格竞争。数字广告面向特定消费者进行定向投放，而传统广告是非定向的。均衡是次优的：若消费者重视媒体产品，则在两类广告下，媒体产品供给均不足；此外，传统广告由于不具有定向性而投放过度。本文刻画了能够克服这些低效率的税收兼补贴政策。该模型使用美国经济数据进行了校准。通过校准模型的视角来看，数字广告显著提高了福利；而最优政策带来的福利收益则远小于数字广告带来的福利收益。
Abstract
Abstract An information-based model is developed where traditional and digital advertising finance the provision of free media goods and affect price competition. Digital advertising is directed toward specific consumers while traditional advertising is undirected. The equilibrium is suboptimal. Media goods, if valued by the consumer, are under provided with both types of advertising. Additionally, traditional advertising is excessive because it is undirected. The tax-cum-subsidy policy that overcomes these inefficiencies is characterized. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy. Through the lens of the calibrated model, digital advertising increases welfare significantly. The welfare gain from the optimal policy is much smaller than the gain from digital advertising.